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Why UAC will not work
Sunday, January 13th, 2008
It’s security’s dirty little secret: Not having your users logged in as root or administrator will not stop malware. There is a huge public security thrust to ensure that users are not constantly logged on with highly privileged access. In Microsoft Windows, this means not being logged in as a member of the administrators group or any of the other 17 groups with admin-like privileges.
In Unix/Linux/BSD, this means not being logged in as root or bin or whatever else is close. In the AS/400, it means not being logged in as Qsysop or Qsecofr. For mainframes, it might mean superuser, terminal 0, or another user label indicating special privileges. Unfortunately, the concept of least privilege is more a popular mantra than a rule in most environments. This is especially true at home, but it’s nearly as bad at work. If you want to find someone logged in as administrator or root all the time, point your finger in the general direction of network security folks: "Do as I say, not as I do." Security design: Why UAC will not work | InfoWorld | Column | 2008-01-11 | By Roger A. Grimes
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